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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
         Appellant Damon Beverly was convicted following a jury 
trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of both counts of a 
two count indictment charging him with robbery of a postal letter 
carrier of mail matter and property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2114 (Count One), and with the use of a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c) (Count Two).  Beverly was sentenced to incarceration of 
110 months on Count One, to be followed by a consecutive sentence 
of 60 months incarceration on Count Two, ordered to pay a fine of 
$1,000.00 and a special assessment fee of $100.00, and ordered 
upon release from prison to serve a period of three years of 
supervised release.   
         There was ample testimony, in particular the testimony 
of the victim mail carrier, of Beverly's involvement in the 
crime.  His appeal is limited to a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to convict him of the crime charged in Count Two.  
He contends that the government failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the device described by the robbery victim 
at trial as a gun meets the statutory definition of "firearm" as 
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).  Thus, he contends that his 
conviction should be vacated and his case remanded for re- 
sentencing.  
         The testimony shows that on December 20, 1994, Beverly 
and another man approached a U.S. Postal Service letter carrier, 
James McCullough, who was making mail deliveries in the 
Philadelphia area.  McCullough testified that the taller of the 
two men, later identified to be Beverly, asked about the contents 
of McCullough's mailbag, lifted up his shirt to reveal a gun in 
the waistband of his pants, and said:  "Be cool.  Don't do 
anything."  App. at 37.  After the shorter man took $20.00 from 
McCullough's trousers, Beverly ordered McCullough to accompany 
him and made several threatening statements to McCullough while 
walking, including, "I have already killed motherfuckers.  Do you 
want to be number eight?  I should pop you right here."  App. at 
38.  McCullough testified that he was "scared" at the time.  Id. 
         McCullough was forced to walk several blocks with his 
assailants to a waiting car, where he was told to get into the 
back seat.  A third individual occupied the driver's seat of the 
automobile.  When the car started moving, Beverly, who sat in the 
front seat, ordered McCullough to pull down his socks and empty 
his pockets, and stated, "I should pop you right here.  I should 
cap you right now."  App. at 40.  McCullough testified that 
Beverly "took [the gun] out so I could see it in the split of the 
front seat."  App. at 41.  McCullough described the gun as a 
chrome-plated revolver.  Id.   
         The assailants continued to drive McCullough around for 
approximately eight minutes, and when they dropped him off 
Beverly instructed him to "Forget about this.  Forget what we 
look like, who we are, you know.  If not, we know where your 
route is.  We will come back and get you and kill you."  App. at 
42.  Beverly was arrested several days later, but the gun was 
never recovered. 
         Beverly, who testified on his own behalf, denied 
participating in the robbery.  He does not repeat that contention 
on appeal, focusing, as we set forth above, on Count Two. 
         When reviewing a jury verdict to determine whether the 
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the 
conviction, we must "'view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution'."  United States v. Messerlian, 832 
F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979)).  The verdict must be 
sustained if "'any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt'."  Id.(quoting 
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789). 
         18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), in relevant part, imposes a five 
year minimum term of imprisonment upon a person who "during and 
in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime  
. . . uses or carries a firearm."  Another section of the statute 
defines a firearm as: 
         (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) 
         which will or is designed to or may readily 
         be converted to expel a projectile by the 
         action of an explosive; (B) the frame or 
         receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm 
         muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any 
         destructive device. . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).           
         In this case, the only evidence presented with respect 
to the firearms charge was the testimony of McCullough that 
Beverly threatened him with a gun during the course of the 
robbery, and that the gun, which was displayed in the car, was a 
chrome-plated revolver.  Although Beverly argues on appeal that 
this testimony is inadequate since McCullough did not testify as 
to the gun's weight, length, or to the fact that he saw the gun 
for more than a "fleeting glance," Appellant's Brief at 28, 
several other courts of appeals have held evidence substantially 
similar to that presented in this case was sufficient to sustain 
a conviction under § 924(c). 
         In Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987), an opinion authored by 
then Circuit Judge Scalia, the court held that non-expert 
testimony that a robber used a gun was enough to justify a 
conviction under § 924(c) even though the weapon used by Parker 
in the bank robbery was not drawn but was stuck in the robber's 
waistband, id. at 1383.  In that case, as here, the gun was not 
recovered and there was no evidence that the gun was fired.  The 
government's evidence consisted only of testimony from two bank 
employees who testified that Parker carried a gun with which he 
threatened to "blow their heads off."  Id. at 1383.  One employee 
described the gun as "silver" with a "vinyl-looking" brown 
handle, and the other testified that she saw the brown handle of 
a small pistol.  Id. 
         In rejecting Parker's challenge to the evidence, the 
court held that the testimony of the two bank employees was 
sufficient to support Parker's § 924(c) conviction.  The court 
analogized Parker's case to United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 
434 (2d Cir. 1970), where the court held that eyewitness 
testimony that two bank robbers brandished a silver revolver and 
a sawed-off shot gun was sufficient to convict the defendants 
under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), 
which provides for an enhanced sentence for those convicted of 
jeopardizing the life of any person "by use of a dangerous 
weapon."  See also United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 
1994) (upholding conviction for use of a firearm during an 
assault on a federal officer based on testimony of two trained 
law enforcement officials that they saw a gun at close range for 
an extended period of time, although they could not have 
determined that it was a real gun, as opposed to a toy or 
replica). 
         In United States v. Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 
1993), a case arising under the same statute at issue here, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), the court sustained the conviction although no 
gun was produced at trial.  As here, in Kirvan there was only 
eyewitness testimony that the defendant brandished a gun during 
the commission of his crime.  One witness testified that the gun 
was black and had a five-inch barrel while another witness 
testified that the gun appeared to be shiny and silver in color, 
and that it was very large for a handgun.  The appellate court 
held that the jury's conclusion that the object was a real gun 
could not be deemed irrational since the description of the gun 
was of "plausible size, colored like a real gun, and quite 
heavy."  Id. at 966.  The court also noted that "while a good 
replica might still fool a witness at a distance, the chances 
decline, where, as here, the witness saw the gun, stationary and 
at a close distance, for at least half a minute."  Id.; see alsoUnited 
States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that lay opinion testimony from three eyewitnesses to a 
bank robbery, each of whom observed the object gripped by the 
defendant at close range was sufficient to sustain a finding that 
the object was a real gun); United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 
460 (4th Cir.) (upholding § 924(c) conviction based upon 
testimony from five eyewitnesses), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1029 
(1990).  
         Beverly emphasizes that after the jury in this case 
rendered its verdict, the trial judge expressed "considerable 
doubt" as to whether the evidence sufficed to uphold the guilty 
verdict on Count Two, and advised Beverly's counsel to file a 
motion for judgment of acquittal on that Count.  App. at 305.   
However, the trial court, after considering Beverly's timely Rule 
29 Motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two, denied the 
motion. 
         We find no error in this ruling.  McCullough saw the 
gun on two different occasions, decreasing the likelihood that he 
was mistaken as to the authenticity of the weapon.  Additionally, 
McCullough's close proximity to Beverly while he brandished the 
weapon further diminishes the possibility that the object he was 
threatened with was anything other than a firearm.  The 
defendant's own expert psychologist testified that, in the 
presence of a gun, the tendency of the victim is to concentrate 
attention on the gun instead of on the face of the assailant.  
App. at 248-49.  Considering this testimony, McCullough had ample 
time to view the weapon while he was in the defendant's car.  
Finally, Beverly threatened McCullough's life numerous times 
during the course of the robbery.  McCullough's testimony was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant 
utilized a firearm in the commission of his crime.  "'The act of 
threatening others with a gun is tantamount to saying that the 
gun is loaded and that the gun wielder will shoot unless his 
commands are obeyed'."  Parker, 801 F.2d at 1384 (quoting 
Marshall, 427 F.2d at 437). 
         We agree with the district court that the evidence 
presented, when considered in the light most favorable to the 
government, was a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find 
that Beverly utilized a firearm in the commission of a violent 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  We will therefore 
affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 
 
